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Abstract[1]
Some of the most innovative philosophical engagement with
cinema and ethics in recent years has come from
phenomenological and cognitivist perspectives. This trend
reflects a welcome re-engagement with cinema as a medium
with the potential for ethical transformation, that is, with the
idea of cinema as a medium of ethical experience. This paper
explores the phenomenological turn in film theory,
emphasizing the ethical implications of phenomenological
approaches to affect and empathy, emotion, and evaluation. I
argue that the oft-criticized subjectivism of phenomenological
theories can be supplemented by cognitivist approaches that
highlight the complex forms of affective response, emotional
engagement, and moral allegiance at work in our experience of
movies. An empathic ethics or “cinempathy” is at work in
many films, I suggest, such as Ashgar Farhadi’s A Separation
(2011), which offers a striking case study in cinematic ethics.
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1.  Introduction
Film theory has traditionally been wary of cinema’s ethical
potential, treating it as a fascinating yet deceptive medium
requiring theoretical analysis and ethico-political critique.
Familiar to many are how theoretical claims about the
ideological power of the “apparatus,” and its pernicious
capacity for the manipulation of audiences through visual
identification and narrative pleasure, fueled the development
of a research paradigm that has only recently began to
wane.[2] Although philosophers of film have began to explore
the question of ethics and cinema, there is surprisingly little
consensus on what this means. How do movies express ethical
ideas? How can they reveal the complexities of a moral or
political situation? What kind of ethical experience can cinema
evoke? I will explore these questions, outlining some of the
theoretical approaches evident in recent work on this topic,
and examining some of the methodological issues raised by
the growing philosophical interest in the relationship between
cinema and ethics.
2.  Cinematic ethics:  mapping an encounter
We can describe ethical approaches to cinema as tending to
focus on one of three aspects of the relationships among film,
spectator, and context: 1) ethics in cinema, focusing on
narrative content, including dramatic scenarios involving
morally charged situations, conflicts, or actions; 2) the ethics
of cinematic representation,focusing on the ethical issues
raised by elements of film production and/or audience
reception, for example, the ongoing debates over the effects of
depictions of screen violence; and 3) the ethics of cinema as a
cultural medium expressing moral beliefs, social values, or
ideology, such as feminist film analysis of gender or Marxist
analyses of ideology in popular film. Each of these three
aspects of the film-spectator-context relationship has spawned
a distinctive approach to the question of cinema and ethics,
though few theorists have attempted to articulate the
relationships between these aspects with a view toward their
ethical implications. 
A common approach in much recent philosophy of film is to
focus on ethics within cinematic representation, that is,
morally relevant themes, problems, and scenarios within the
narrative or approaching film as a moral "thought experiment."
Think of Stanley Cavell’s “moral perfectionist” reading of the
melodrama Stella Dallas (Vidor, 1937) according to which
brassy Stella comes to a greater understanding of herself and
makes an ethical decision to give her daughter Laurel a
chance at marital and social happiness by deliberately
withdrawing herself from her daughter’s life. Another example
is the Dardenne Brothers’ film, The Promise (La promesse)
(1996), where teenage Igor (Jérémie Renier) decides to defy
his father and assist illegal immigrant widow Assita in escaping
exploitation and deportation, honoring his promise to the
woman’s dying husband that he will look after Assita and her
baby son. Or consider Alejandro Amenábar’s The Sea Within
(Mar adentro) (2004), based on the true story of Ramon
Sampredo (Javier Bardem), who became a quadriplegic at age
28 and campaigned for the rest of his life in support of
euthanasia and the right to die with dignity. This is a film
noted for its innovative use of point of view to provide a
powerful ethical experience for the viewer and understood as a
kind of cinematic argument for assisted euthanasia.
Film theorists have often focused on the ethics of cinematic
representation, whether from the filmmaker's perspective
(production) or from the spectator's perspective (reception).
Consider, for example, debates over objectivity and truth in
documentary representation and whether a filmmaker can use
elements of fiction in the presentation of what purports to be
fact. An example is Michael Moore’s creative reorganization of
dates and events in his documentary Roger and Me (1989). Or
we might ponder the ethics of how a filmmaker treats cast and
crew, such as in Werner Herzog’s filming of the epic
Fitzcarraldo, during which a number of indigenous
crewmembers were injured. Or we might be drawn to debates
over how spectators respond to images of sex and violence,
such as depictions of rape in “new French extremity” cinema,
for example, or the use of non-simulated sex scenes in von
Trier’s Antichrist and Nymphomaniac.[3] The ethics of
cinematic spectatorship is clearly one of the central concerns
in recent film theory, an approach that has probably garnered
the most attention in research on the relationship between
cinema and ethics.
Film theory, however, has also been long concerned with the
broader social, cultural, and political implications of cinema.
Since the 1970s it has emphasized the ethics of cinema as a
medium symptomatic of broader cultural-historical or
ideological perspectives, such as feminist analyses of gender
and Marxist analyses of ideology. Consider Kathryn Bigelow’s
two films on the Iraq war, The Hurt Locker (2008) and Zero
Dark Thirty (2012). Both films were celebrated for their
cinematic accomplishment as powerful and suspenseful action-
war movies, but also criticized for offering ideologically slanted
depictions of American soldiers fighting an irrational enemy in
Iraq. Zero Dark Thirty, for example, even implies that the
heightened interrogation techniques deployed by the CIA
ultimately led to the capture of Osama bin Laden. It thus
offered a dubious utilitarian moral justification (the “ticking
bomb” scenario) for the use of torture in prosecuting the so-
called War on Terror. At the same time, Bigelow’s focalizing
the narrative through female CIA operative Maya (Jessica
Chastain), who doggedly pursues bin Laden when her male
peers and superiors have given up, lends this film an
interesting feminist slant.
It is clear that all three aspects of the cinema-ethics
relationship are important, but the challenge is to think them
together in their mutually overlapping relationships. As I hope
to show, the idea of cinema as a medium of ethical experience
offers a way of bringing these three dimensions together,
linking style and content, creation and reception, and context
and interpretation in ways that enable us to explore cinema’s
ethical potential as a transformative medium, one with the
power to transform our ways of seeing, experiencing, and
thinking. This is not to deny the important critical work done
in theorizing cinema and its moral-political or ideological
effects. My aim, rather, is to redress the one-sidedness of
prevailing approaches in film theory and to offer a new
perspective on the manner in which film can contribute to
philosophy, that is, cinema as a medium of ethical experience.
3.  Key approaches to cinematic ethics
What are the dominant approaches to cinematic ethics evident
in film philosophy theory today? I would identify the following
currents of thought: 1) Cavellian (cinema as exploring
scepticism, the everyday, and moral perfectionism); 2)
Deleuzian (cinema as exploring time, thought, and the body;
expressing immanent “modes of existence” or giving us
“reasons to believe in this world”); 3) phenomenological and
post-phenomenological (diverse phenomenological-style
analyses of affect, perception, emotion, and embodiment and
how these relate to moral-ethical experience; the Levinasian
ethics of responsibility towards the “Other” as applied to film);
and 4) cognitivist approaches (theories of affective and
emotional response to film, which account for moral allegiance
with characters and broader ethical evaluation in narrative
cinema). All of these approaches offer valuable theoretical
insights for understanding cinema and ethics. Here, however, I
will focus on the third and fourth, exploring the intersection
between phenomenological and cognitivist approaches to
theorizing emotional engagement, in particular the interplay
between empathy and sympathy, or what I call “cinempathy.”
Some of the most innovative philosophical engagement with
cinema and ethics in recent years has come from
phenomenological and cognitivist perspectives in film theory.
This trend reflects a welcome re-engagement with cinema as
a medium with the potential for ethical transformation, that is,
with the idea of cinema as a medium of ethical experience.
Such an approach challenges the familiar critical view in film
theory, according to which cinema’s power of affective and
emotional engagement contributes to the construction of
dominant “subject positions,” and thereby reproduces ideology
through the manipulation of spectator subjectivity. Recent
phenomenological and cognitivist approaches to empathy and
sympathy, however, offer new ways of understanding and
explaining our emotional and ethical engagement with moving
images. The oft-criticized subjectivism of phenomenological
theories can be supplemented by cognitivist approaches that
analyze the complex forms of affective response, emotional
engagement, and moral allegiance at work in our experience of
movies. I will explore this phenomenological and cognitivist
approach to empathy and sympathy,  or “cinempathy,” as
intimately related dynamic processes involved in emotional
engagement and ethical responsiveness. My claim is that such
a cinempathy can be found at work in films such as Ashgar
Farhadi’s A Separation (2011), which offers a striking case
study in cinematic ethics.
4.  The affective turn in film theory
The power of movies, as Sergei Eisenstein, along with Noël
Carroll and David Bordwell, have remarked, resides in their
capacity to elicit emotional engagement.[4] Yet until the
recent affective turn in film theory since the late 1990s, topics
such as emotion, emotional engagement, and affect, not to
mention empathy and sympathy, were largely ignored by the
then-dominant semiotic, Marxist, and feminist forms of
psychoanalytic film theory. The affective turn across the
humanities, however, has put emotion, “the body,” and
subjectivity at the center of theoretical inquiry, while also
opening up new forms of ethico-political reflection. As Jinhee
Choi and Mattias Frey remarked, the ethical turn in film theory
“stresses the particular affective nature of film spectatorship”
such that “perceptual and sensorial engagement with film is
considered ethical in and of itself.”[5] Emotion and affect are
again central issues in film theory, which has been rejuvenated
by contributions from philosophy, empirical psychology,
cognitive theory, neuroscience, and evolutionary biology.
Philosophy of film, in both continental and analytic-cognitivist
guises, has thus developed new ways of thinking about affect,
emotion, and the ethico-aesthetic experience of cinema as an
aesthetic encounter that opens up varieties of ethically
significant experience.
These two currents of thought, phenomenological and
cognitivist, can be identified as defining recent work on affect
and emotion in cinema. The broad sweep of phenomenological
approaches in film studies, from Vivian Sobchack’s work to
various forms of affect theory, offer concrete and focused
explorations of embodied subjective experience. Indeed, the
turn to phenomenological theories focusing on affective
experience, both from the spectator perspective and in relation
to cinematic expression, has become so influential that we
may talk of an “affective turn” in film philosophy.
Phenomenological approaches, foregrounding the experiential
aspects of cinema, put the human subject back into the
picture, albeit a subject defined by its affects, its corporeality,
and its embodied difference. Such theories are generally
eclectic, deriving in part from classical and post-war
phenomenology (see Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger),
as well as drawing on feminist, culturalist, European
continental as well as cognitivist sources.[6] All of them tend
to affirm the centrality of first-person experiential perspectives
that can be applied not only to the theorization of spectator
response but sometimes attributing subjective traits, like
embodiment or intentionality, to the film itself.[7] Crossover
theorization drawing, for example, on phenomenological and
cognitivist or Deleuzian and neuroscientific approaches is
becoming more common.[8] These hybrid approaches provide
a rich interdisciplinary theoretical matrix for exploring the
complexities of affect and emotion, including empathy and
sympathy, in our aesthetic and ethical experience of cinema.
Cognitivism is the other most developed alternative approach
to the superseded paradigm of semiotic-psychoanalytic film
theory. In broad terms, we can describe cognitivism as an
empirically-grounded, naturalistic approach that rejects
speculative film theory in favor of a piecemeal theory of film
experience that uses the tools of cognitive psychology and
cognitivist theories of mind. Although early forms of cognitive
theory indeed modeled the brain as operating computationally
(using the algorithmic processes of the computer as an
analogy for how our brains process information), more recent
forms of cognitive theory have moved on towards modular,
network, and, even more recently, embodied, embedded,
extended, and enactive conceptions of mind—the “4e model of
cognition.”
The standard challenge facing phenomenology is how to avoid
the charge of subjectivism: to articulate and account for the
relationship between first-person phenomenological description
and more general theoretical explanation. How do we connect
the first-person, experientially rich description of a
phenomenon, like affect, to the empirically grounded,
explanatory theory of the causal mechanisms (physiological
and neurological) underlying subjective phenomena? As for
cognitivism, many critics acknowledge that it offers powerful
explanatory theories of the underlying causal processes
involved in our experience of cinema, but this does not mean
that it provides a hermeneutic framework for film
interpretation or aesthetic evaluation.[9] Even if we have a
general explanatory theory of the evolutionary usefulness or
neurological basis of cinematic experience, this may not be
especially enlightening when applied to particular film
examples or offer sufficient resources to evaluate film from an
aesthetic perspective. The danger of reductionism looms large
for such critics, who accuse cognitivism of downplaying
important aesthetic, hermeneutic, and ethico-political
dimensions of cinema.
The most productive path between these alternatives, I
suggest, is an interdisciplinary one, drawing on the subjective
perspective of phenomenology as a descriptive approach to
cinematic experience, and the objective orientation of
cognitivism that aims to develop explanatory theories
concerning central features of our experience of movies.
Recent hybrid forms of film theory attempt this kind of
synthesizing approach, supplementing the subjectivism of
phenomenology with the objectivism of cognitivism, but also
striving to remain true to the complexity of the phenomena
under consideration. In this pluralist spirit, I turn to consider
affective and emotional engagement in film in order to explore
how narrative cinema can evoke ethical experience.
5. Affect and emotion
The first challenge is to describe the phenomena in a manner
that is accurate without being unwieldy. Most theorists agree
that emotions include a physiological aspect (changes in
autonomous physiological processes); a psychological aspect,
an affective or ‘feeling’ aspect, a sensory-motor or action-
oriented aspect; and an evaluative or cognitive aspect. When I
am angry I experience physiological changes in my body
(accelerated heartbeat, muscle tension, adrenaline flow), my
psychological state (increased aggression or a desire to “act
out”), and my affective state (feeling tense, a sense of
agitated arousal), linked with a rapid cognitive appraisal of my
situation (a belief that I have been wronged, a construal of the
other’s behaviour as a threat). My anger has an object, which
serves as the reason for my getting angry (a reckless driver
swerving in front of me), and it enables me to evaluate my
situation and act accordingly (to take evasive action).
Emotions condense these affective, bodily, and cognitive
responses in a manner that enables the rapid evaluation of my
situation and the taking of appropriate action in response to
my situation.
Analyzing emotions from phenomenological and cognitivist
perspectives reveals a number of constitutive elements. To list
the most salient, first, emotions are temporal and episodic, in
that they unfold in time, have a definite duration, and are
transient phenomena. Second, they arise and develop
according to feedback from our bodies and from our
environment. Our emotional life, as Carl Plantinga observes,
“occurs in streams that continuously evolve in response to
everchanging construals, actions and action tendencies, bodily
states, and feelings,” any of which can serve as feedback to
modify our subsequent emotional responses.[10] Third,
emotions are intimately related to narratives, that is, they can
be triggered by acquired paradigm scenarios or emotional
scripts, and my emotional state is shaped by the kind of
narrative meaning through which I make sense of my identity
and describe my emotions to others. Fourth, emotions vary in
duration and intensity, waxing and waning over time, or
varying in affective amplitude. Fifth, emotions are often mixed
or ambiguous. Primary emotions, such as anger, fear, disgust,
happiness, sadness, and surprise, are often discrete, yet
emotions usually occur in complex affective “clusters” that can
be difficult to define. Sixth, emotions are distinct from moods,
which are more global, encompassing, diffuse, and “world-
disclosing” (Heidegger). To be more precise, emotions have
intentional objects (fear of a speeding car, of losing one’s job,
of getting cancer), whereas moods lack an intentional object,
so can be free-floating or oriented towards our being-in-the-
world, in general. From a hermeneutic point of view, emotions
can be understood in terms of reasons (I was angry with you
because of what you said to me), whereas moods have more
dispersed causes (physical fatigue, environmental factors,
physiological changes, the aesthetic qualities of my
surroundings, existential feelings, and so on). Seventh,
emotions can be further primed or cued according to discrete
environmental factors, background mood, mental outlook, and
ongoing emotional dynamics. And finally, eighth, we can have
propensities towards certain emotional responses (character
traits) that make up an emotional disposition (prone to anger,
habitually cheerful, or consistently calm and measured) as
opposed to emotions as occurent states (a flash of anger, a
sense of joy). These general features of emotions are essential
to our aesthetic experience of cinema, which, in Ed Tan’s
phrase, is an “emotion machine” possessing the power to
engage us emotionally through audiovisual means. 
Definitions of emotion are legion. Following Robert C. Roberts,
Carl Plantinga defines emotional responses as concern-based
construals that are at once cognitive, relational, intentional,
and embodied.[11] Robert Solomon defines them as cognitive
judgments that work through feeling more than
reasoning.[12] Peter Goldie describes the intentionality of
emotions as a phenomenological “feeling towards” that
expresses both a concern and a potential for action, without
being “intellectual” or “cognitive,” in the narrower sense of
these terms.[13] Affective responses (bodily feelings,
sensations, corporeal states) often occur in ways that are
involuntary, or below the threshold of conscious intention, yet
they orient and qualify emotional responses and prime our
bodies to take appropriate action depending on our emotional-
cognitive appraisal of a situation. Emotions thus provide a
powerful sensory-motor and rapid cognitive-evaluative way of
responding to social situations within our culturally complex
life-worlds.
6.  Empathy and sympathy, or “cinempathy”
Of particular interest in recent years, not only in aesthetics but
in moral psychology and ethics, are the affective-imaginative
phenomena of empathy and sympathy. These phenomena,
however, are notoriously contested, with ongoing arguments
over their meaning, purpose, and value. Indeed, a brief glance
at the literature reveals a complicated situation. There are
disputes over the definition of these terms, whether they
designate two discrete emotional capacities, whether the
distinction between them is confused, whether they are better
used as synonyms, whether they name imaginative
operations, whether they work through the simulation of
another’s emotional response, whether empathy means that I
share the same emotional state as another, or a congruent
emotional state (Plantinga), or merely imagine myself
experiencing someone’s emotional state, and so on.
When it comes to film theory, the complexities continue to
proliferate. Empathy is often identified with “identification”
(with characters and their emotional states), which is itself a
contested term. Some theorists identify empathy with pre-
conscious involuntary responses, such as affective mimicry or
emotional contagion (the tendency to unconsciously mimic the
affective states and expressions of others or to “catch” their
emotional state through the mirroring of facial expression and
bodily gesture). Others, such as Amy Coplan, argue that
empathy should not be identified with affective mimicry or
emotional contagion, since these are non-voluntary affective
responses, whereas empathy—as the capacity to imagine and
respond emotionally to another, while maintaining a
discernible self-other distinction—requires a complex
imaginative construal of the other’s situation, along with a
cognitive-emotional evaluation of their expressions, intentions,
and actions.[14] Some theorists, moreover, go on to identify
empathy (and sympathy) as key to our capacity for moral
perception (the ability to discern, recognize, or be attentive to
the moral predicament or sufferings of others). Martha
Nussbaum and Stanley Cavell, for example, suggest that
literature and film can be regarded as artistic means of
exercising and thus cultivating moral imagination, which opens
up the possibility of enhancing our capacity for moral
understanding and promoting the exercise of ethical
conduct.[15]
Instead of working through this tangled web, however, I shall
focus on the distinction between empathy and sympathy,
arguing that it remains important for film philosophy, even
though the phenomena in question tend to coalesce. I am
referring to empathy and sympathy here as imaginative
capacities to respond emotionally to the situation of others,
rather than as an expression of emotional solidarity or moral
support. One of the most useful ways of distinguishing these,
as Alex Neill observes, is to describe sympathy as feeling for
someone while empathy is feeling with him or her.[16] I feel
sympathy for my friend who has just lost her father, without
myself experiencing a state of grief, yet at his funeral I might
feel empathy for her and find myself grieving and crying along
with her family. Here one could say that sympathy spills over
into empathy, and empathy over into sympathy, intensified by
affective mimicry and emotional priming due to the particular
features of the social situation (a funeral), with its relevant
paradigm scenarios. From a phenomenological perspective,
empathy and sympathy can be described as perspectival poles
between which we are perceptually and affectively moved,
poles marking two distinct yet related kinds of subjective
perspective-taking having different but related emotional
dynamics and evaluative valences. As I shall elaborate, this is
crucial for understanding how cinema engages us empathically
and sympathetically in a dynamic manner unfolding in time.
The case of empathy and sympathy as they relate to fictional
characters is also intriguing. They do not exist as real people,
yet I can have a sympathetic engagement or empathetic
response while being aware that such characters are fictional.
To resolve any potential paradox (Radford’s “paradox of
fiction”), theorists have pointed to the “pretend” (Walton) or to
the “simulated” (Currie) character of these emotions, or else to
the imaginative character of empathy (and sympathy), namely
the capacity to imaginatively adopt the other’s perspective,
either from a first-person point of view (empathy) or from an
observer or witness perspective (sympathy). I imagine the
others' grief and can either experience it myself, or experience
“congruent emotional states” (Plantinga), like sorrow or
sadness, or else imagine the emotional response that the other
might be experiencing, without actually having that same
emotion myself. Murray Smith, for example, drawing on
Richard Wollheim, describes this as central versus acentral
imagining.
In central imagining (empathy), I imagine the other’s
emotional state from his or her point of view, while in acentral
or peripheral imagining,[17] I imagine it from an observer or
third-person perspective, without feeling the emotion itself. In
watching a mother struck by grief over the death of her son
(Mrs. O’Brien (Jessica Chastain) in Terrence Malick’s The Tree
of Life), I can imaginatively participate in her emotional
experience despite knowing she is fictional, and despite being
neither a mother nor having experienced this kind of
devastating loss. I am also moved, both emotionally and
audio-visually, so that I adopt, depending on the mode of
cinematic presentation, now a central, now a peripheral
perspective on her experience of grief at learning of her son’s
death. Empathic and sympathetic responses are elicited here
as part of an unfolding temporal, affective, and emotional
dynamic involving the complex interplay of point of view,
expressive gesture, emotional contagion, and imaginative-
cognitive evaluation of the characters we are seeing on screen.
All of these processes come into play in the empathic and
sympathetic emotional engagement with characters in a given
fictional situation, with its relevant paradigm scenarios or
learned emotional “scripts.”
Part of cinema’s power, in short, is to elicit the kind of
affective mimicry or emotional contagion responses that prime
us for empathy and sympathy. In order to experience these
responses, however, we also need to have formed certain
views of the characters, evaluated their situation, imagined—
or for some theorists, simulated—their subjective experience
or emotional responses to what befalls them, moving
effortlessly from first person to third person or from central to
peripheral perspectives, thanks to the aesthetic devices of
cinematic composition involving mood setting, emotional
cueing, point of view, shot selection, audio effects and musical
accompaniment, color, lighting, mise-en-scene, performance
and gesture, shot duration, alterations in visual perspective,
movement within the frame, visual focus on faces or emphasis
on expressive bodily gestures, and so on.
Within what Plantinga calls “scenes of empathy”—cinematic
scenes designed to elicit empathic responses—we usually find
a number of features that correspond to the elements of
emotional response.[18] These include the use of close-ups
and long takes focused on the facial expressions and bodily
gestures of characters, that magnify the expression of affect
and emotion but also ensure sufficient duration for an
emotional dynamic to be established. There is the selective
use of visual and aural cues, such as lighting, shadow, color,
music, vocalization, sound effects, but also stasis and
movement, such as stasis of the camera to allow duration and
expression to be perceived, and movement of the camera to
express and generate kinetic resonance and affective
excitation. As Murray Smith, Carl Plantinga, and Jane Stadler
have noted, it is not simply point-of-view shots showing the
visual perspective of a character that suggest empathic
involvement; rather, it is more often reaction shots showing
either the object of the character’s attention or the character’s
own emotional responses that generate the effective forms of
empathy and sympathy.[19] Long takes on their own,
however, will not suffice; rather, they must be combined with
alternating different points of view in order to create an
intensive, dynamic, space within which emotional expression
and the elicitation of empathy and/or sympathy become
manifest.
Instead of discrete forms of emotional engagement that
remain independent of each other, cinema can render the
dynamic movement between poles of empathy and sympathy,
moving smoothly between central and peripheral imagining,
thus enabling spectators to both emotionally engage with and
ethically evaluate the fictional characters within a plausible
cinematic world. This movement between poles of empathy
and sympathy reflects better, I suggest, the phenomenological
experience of emotional-cognitive engagement that other
theorists have described using concepts such as moral
perception, sympathy, or compassion, Einfühlung or empathy.
We could therefore describe this dynamic movement between
perspectival poles of empathy and sympathy as a
“cinempathy:” a cinematic/kinetic expression of the synergy
between affective attunement, emotional engagement, and
moral evaluation that captures more fully the ethical potential
of the cinematic experience. This more dynamic conception of
empathic-sympathetic involvement is a better way of
conceptually articulating cinematic empathy than the rather
static, punctual model of theorizing empathy and sympathy
that still prevails in contemporary film theory.
7.  Cinempathy in A Separation
To consider this movement between empathic and sympathetic
perspectives, let us turn to Ashgar Farhani’s familial drama A
Separation (2011). To give some narrative background, the
three protagonists, Nader (Peyman Moaadi), Simin (Leila
Hatami), and their daughter Termeh (Sarina Farhadi) are
shown at a crucial juncture in the ongoing domestic drama of
a marital separation and custody dispute that is tearing apart
this ordinary Iranian family. The father, Nader, who is
committed to staying in Iran to look after his ailing father, is
fighting with the mother Simin, who wants to remove their
daughter Termeh from being raised and educated in a country
undergoing a conservative-religious turn. In the scene that I
wish to discuss (1:41:02 to 1:47:52), Simin has returned from
negotiating with their housekeeper Razieh and her husband
Hojjat, managing to secure their tentative agreement to
accept a reduced amount of “blood money” as compensation
for an accident involving Razieh and her subsequent
miscarriage for which Nader is being held responsible. The
housekeeper’s husband Hojjat initially refuses but is persuaded
by his family to accept the offer, since they desperately need
the money. Simin now has to persuade Nader to agree to this
compromise deal, principally for the sake of their daughter’s
well-being, but also to save what is left of their disintegrating
marriage.
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This powerful sequence is noteworthy for its skillful evocation
of a variety of sympathetic and empathic responses. It is also
striking for the manner in which it defocalizes the narrative
away from privileging one particular protagonist and
repeatedly shifts the viewer’s attention, including his or her
emotional engagement and moral allegiance, between Simin
and Nader, offering equal weight to their perspectives, and
thus situating their actions within a shifting emotional dynamic
that reveals the complexities of their social situation. Although
the argument that unfolds between them is sharply focused,
intense, and realistic, the film avoids privileging one
character’s position over any other. Rather, the camera
alternates between shots and reverse shots focusing on both
characters, establishing affective alignment and emotional
allegiance but alternating these so as to capture and convey
the conflicted quality of their heated exchange. The camera
initially presents Simin from a frontal perspective and Nader in
profile, turning away, but then changes perspective to show
Nader more frontally and Simin now in profile or turning away.
Simin and Termeh are initially shown embracing, their faces
concealed from our view, then later as struggling and fighting,
their faces again removed from sight as we hear their conflict
unfold off-screen. The movements of the characters alternate
from seated (and heated) conversations at the kitchen table,
faces openly revealed or turning away, then standing up,
moving away, turning around, leaving the kitchen, crossing
doorways, struggling across spatial thresholds, and
communicating across windows and other barriers. The camera
then takes up a new perspective for the fight between Simin
and Termeh by the doorway, and another perspective again on
Termeh and her father, whose final ultimatum leaves her at a
loss, concluding with a lingering shot of Nader’s pensive face,
their future unresolved.
Throughout this sequence, long-take close-ups of facial
expressions—typical “scenes of empathy”—alternate with
passages of rapidly edited shots; these establish a kinetic
rhythm that effectively conveys the increasingly antagonistic
nature of their argument. The effect is to move the viewer
visually and affectively between these conflicting perspectives
without privileging one over the other or offering one
protagonist as the focalizing character from whose perspective
the fight might ordinarily have been shown, for example,
following and foregrounding Simin’s perspective as she tries to
persuade Nader to relent and agree to the compensation.
Instead, the perspective shifts from Simin to Nader, then to
Termeh and Simin, and then to Termeh and Nader, before
concluding with Nader watching Termeh and Simin driving
away. The concluding long shot of Nader also invites us to
ponder what will become of the conflicted family and how their
separation, at multiple levels, might be overcome.
This dynamic movement across different perspectives,
alternating perspective-taking across both characters, thus
preventing hasty moralizing judgment while inviting a deeper
critical reflection on the context and dynamics of their conflict,
is a fine example of cinempathy: the kinetic-cinematic practice
of alternating perspective-taking in a manner both
sympathetic and empathic, an alternating of perspectives that
opens up a deeper intersubjective understanding of the
characters’ situation. It puts the spectator simultaneously in
the position of sympathetic witness and empathic protagonist,
shifting between these perspectives in relation to individual
characters, across different character perspectives, and
between the particular character relationships during the
course of their escalating conflict. It offers an alternation of
perspective-taking that distributes the affective dynamic
across different characters and invites complex, multi-
perspectival understanding in response to the dynamic
complexities of social interaction. Such a cinematic-empathic
approach thus provides an experientially “thick” description
revealing the complexity of their emotional responses, the
clashing reasons for their conflict, and the risks of accepting
hasty moral or moralizing judgments that are too readily
abstracted from the ethical and moral complexities of their
shared social situation. It offers a striking instance of
cinematic ethics in the flesh.
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